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The burden sharing of pollution  abatement  costs  raises the  issue of how to 
share  the  costs  between  entities  (country,  region  or  industry)  and  how  the 
pollution  permits  should  be  distributed  between  the  parties  involved.  This 
paper explores this issue in the framework of a dynamic endogenous growth 2 
sectors – 2 regions – 2 inputs Heckscher-Ohlin model of a small open multi-
regional  economy  with  an  international  tradable  permits  market.  Given  an 
"emission-based  grand-fathering"  sharing  rule,  capital  accumulation  is  more 
negatively affected by the environmental policy in the energy intensive sector. 
We show that such a property does not necessarily hold with a "production-
based grand-fathering" sharing rule. We also show that the impact on capital is 
likely to translate into the sectoral added value level after some time, specially 
if  the  economy  is  submitted  to  an  increasingly  constraining  environmental 
policy driving up the ratio price of permits to price of energy. Finally, we show 
that the impact of environmental policy at the regional level depends crucially 
on the specialization of the region along the baseline. 
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The burden sharing of pollution abatement costs, e.g. in the Kyoto Protocol context,
raises the issue of how to share the costs between entities (country, region or industry)
and how the pollution permits should be distributed between the parties involved in the
Protocol. In Belgium, the debate opposes in particular the Flemish and Walloon regions.
W.r.t. the other regions, Wallonia is characterized by an industry which is more energy
consuming. From the point of view of Flanders, the bulk of the e®ort should thus be
made in Wallonia, where the abatement measures are assumed to be less expensive. On
the contrary, this solution is considered to be too unfavourable by Wallonia.
Now it is important to emphasize that the fact that a country's activities are more
energy consuming does not necessarily result from their ine±ciency. It can also result
from the specialization of this country in the production of relatively energy intensive
goods, a specialization conditioned itself by its comparative advantages and which should
bene¯t through international trade to all countries involved in it.
In the context of the Belgian burden sharing debate, Germain et al. (2006) develop
a model of a 2 sectors - 2 regions small open economy, where each sector produces one
good by using fossil energy and another sector speci¯c factor1. Sector 1 is more energy
intensive and thus more polluting than sector 2. One region is more specialized in the
energy intensive sector. Hence, its energy consumption per unit of added value is higher.
Given an environmental policy that increases the price of energy (through an energy tax
or through the tradable permits price), the authors show as a ¯rst result that the energy
intensive sector is more burdened than the other sector, so that the region specialized in
the energy intensive sector is more burdened than the other region.
Now this intuitive result does not necessarily extend when one takes into account the
tax revenues or the tradable permits endowments associated to the control of pollution.
The impacts of an emission reduction policy can indeed be modulated by bringing into
play such transfers assigned to the regions. In this respect the above authors compute
the permits endowments to the regions such that the environmental policy has both the
property to be e±cient (i.e. abatement marginal costs are equalized between sectors and
regions) and fair (i.e. the relative losses of welfare are identical between regions). The
endowment is of course relatively more generous for the region specialized in the energy
intensive sector. And the di®erence between regional permits endowments is higher, (i)
the higher the national objective in terms of emission reduction, and (ii) the more the
regions are unevenly a®ected by the climate policy.
The analysis of Germain et al. (2006) presents the drawback to be static. However
a region or a country's factor endowments and thus its specialization are likely to evolve
through time. Consequently the impacts on this region or country of a long term environ-
mental policy (like climate policies) are also likely to evolve through time. On the other
hand, if the impacts of an environmental policy on a country's welfare depend on its spe-
cialization, the dependence is likely to go the other way around. Indeed it seems probable
that an emission reduction policy that translates in an increase of the total cost of energy
will induce a change in a country's specialization towards less energy intensive products,
and this seems the more likely to happen the more this country is initially specialized in
energy intensive goods.
In this paper, we shall consider a dynamic model allowing for specialization rever-
1These speci¯c factors can be considered as aggregates of all non-fossil energy factors (such as capital,
labour, infrastructure, non fossil energies,...) with di®erent composition .
1sal. One way to get such a property is to incorporate time-dependent spillovers across
economic sectors and regions. This might even be the easiest way to generate reversals
in specialization. There is an extensive literature about spillovers both at a regional or
international level. In particular, the empirical assessment of such spillovers have been
at the heart of a quite abundant empirical literature. An important and early contribu-
tion to the topic is due to Coe and Helpman (1995) who assessed the economic growth
impact of R&D expenditures in OECD countries. They found that such expenditures are
bene¯cial not only for the performing countries but also for the trade partners. Smolny
(1999) provided an empirical evaluation of international sectoral spillovers for German
and US industries using a broad panel of industry sector data for both countries over
the period 1960-1990. In particular, Smolny analyzed productivity convergence, trying
to disentangling the precise mechanisms behind. He found that most of the convergence
comes from total factor productivity convergence, and more importantly, that endogenous
growth models relying on knowledge spillovers are con¯rmed by the estimates. Lejour and
Nahuis (2005) studied in deep the sectoral nature of R&D spillovers and its impact on
economic growth. They stressed that the e®ects of sectoral spillovers do depend on the
specialization patterns.
There are also plenty of empirical contributions addressing the issue of spillovers' extent at
a regional level. Among them, Van Stel and Nieuwenhuijsen (2004) is a good illustration
of this stream of literature. While they did not ¯nd any compelling evidence on the
growth e®ect of specialization, in contrast to Lejour and Nahuis (2005), they identi¯ed
some clear spillovers in certain sectors (specially in the sector services). As one can see,
the empirical debate on spillovers is currently much more centered on the kind of relevant
spillovers than on the existence of such spillovers, which seems largely admitted. One
of the crucial issues turn out to be whether intra-sectoral or inter-sectoral spillovers are
more important for economic growth. As to this precise point, the evidence is mixed. A
recent study by Malerba, Mancusi and Montobbio (2004) tends however to put forward
intra-sectoral spillovers. Using a unique panel data on R&D expenditures and patent
citations in 135 narrowly de¯ned technological classes (or sectors) in France, Italy, Japan,
United-Kingdom and the US, over the period 1981-1995, they show that the e®ect of
intra-sectoral spillovers is 70% higher than the e®ect of national inter-sectoral spillovers.
We shall incorporate intra-sectoral spillovers in our model: the industries in a given sec-
tor of a given region are assumed to bene¯t from knowledge spillovers from the industries
of the same sector in the other region. As we shall see in Section 2, considering at
the same time inter and intra-sectoral spillovers in our model would induce the same
long-run capital accumulation in ALL sectors and in ALL regions, which sounds an un-
desirable outcome as it implies that the sectoral composition of the economy is irrelevant
in the long-run. Recent studies on two-sector growth models tend rather to emphasize
that investment-speci¯c technological progress (as opposed to the typical Harrod-neutral
technological progress at work in the consumption good sector) is likely to generate a per-
sistent productivity gap between the capital good and consumption good sectors, which
should translate into di®erent patterns of capital accumulation. This divergence is clearly
re°ected in the downward trend of the relative price of capital, ¯rst pointed out by Gor-
don (1990), and later exploited in a two-sector accounting framework by Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Krusell (1997).
The aim of this paper is to study the impacts of long term environmental policies in
the framework of a dynamic 2 sectors - 2 regions - 2 inputs (capital and energy) Heckscher-
2Ohlin model of a small open multiregional economy with an international tradable permits
market. The main features of the model are the following. Contrary to Germain et al.'s
static model, factor endowments are no more exogenous (except in the ¯rst period). Sector
1 produces capital goods while sector 2 produces consumer goods. Energy is imported and
emissions are proportional to energy use. Sector 1 is more energy intensive than sector
2. The technologies of both sectors are the same in both regions. Because the country
is treated as a small open economy, prices are determined by the rest of the world and
are thus exogenous. One of the two regions is specialized in the production of the energy
intensive good. Growth in endogenous : returns to scale are decreasing at the level of
the ¯rm, but because of the technological spillovers, returns to scale are constant at the
sectoral level.
The model is an endogenous growth model, where the aggregate productivity of a
¯rm depends on the capital accumulated at the level of the sector and the region to
which it belongs. The spillovers are intra-sectoral as already mentioned: For a given
sector, there are technological spillovers from one region to the other. Thanks to these
spillovers, returns to scale at the sectoral level are constant. This is the simplest way
to model spillovers. It is based on the Arrowian learning-by-investing mechanism, re-
suscitated by Romer (1986). Introducing R&D expenditures would have complicated
unnecessarily the model given our main objectives. Rather we consider the shortcut of
learning-by-investing to get a tractable yet far from trivial inter-sectoral inter-regional
growth model. Boucekkine, del Rio and Licandro (2003) have already studied two-sector
models with learning-by-investing in each sector. However, they consider a non-regional
closed-economy, which has its advantages and its disadvantages from the analytical point
of view. Given the environmental motivation of the paper, it seems out of question that
the open economy structure adopted here is more adapted.
Within our framework, the respective specializations of the two regions converge
through time, but not necessarily in a monotonous way. Following BÄ ohringer and Lange
(2005), the permits endowment of a ¯rm is a function of its past emissions, and according
to the scenario, this feature is internalized by the ¯rm or not. The impact of the environ-
mental policy on the sectors with respect to the baseline (no policy) scenario is compared
successively at the level of (i) the sectors' growth rate, (ii) the sectors' capital stock, (iii)
the sectors' added value, (iv) the sectors' revenue after transfers (i.e. taking account of
the permits endowments), (v) the regions' added value, and (vi) the regions' revenue after
transfers.
We now summarize the principal results. At the level of the growth rate and of the
capital stock,
(i) a ¯rst result is that a given sector is identically a®ected in both regions. This follows
from the fact that regions face the same exogenous prices and share the same technologies.
(ii) Given an "emission-based grand-fathering" sharing rule, a second result is that the
energy intensive sector is more (negatively) a®ected by the environmental policy than the
other sector.
To evaluate how results depends on the chosen endowment rule, we consider a dynamic
production-based grandfathering rule, where a ¯rm's current permits endowments depends
on its previous period production. And we indeed show that result (ii) above does not
necessarily hold with such a "production-based grand-fathering" sharing rule.
The impact of the environmental policy at the sectoral added value level results from
(i) its impact at the capital level identi¯ed in the previous paragraph and (ii) a "price
3e®ect" linked to the increase of the total cost of energy. This second e®ect is favorable to
the energy intensive sector because the elasticity of its energy consumption to the total
cost of energy is higher. Thus the comparison of the impacts on the sectoral added value
is not trivial. Nevertheless, in the case of an "emission-based grand-fathering" sharing
rule, one veri¯es that the impact at the level of capital is likely to prevail after some time.
This will in particular happen in the case of an economy submitted to a more and more
constraining environmental policy driving up the ratio price of permits/price of energy.
The total sectoral revenue is de¯ned as the sectoral added value plus the net transfer
received by the sector. This net transfer is equal to the endowment of permits received less
the permits used, multiplied by the price of permits. Because the baseline is characterized
by sectoral growth rates that converge to the same limit, and under the assumption that
no sector is advantaged w.r.t. the other (i.e. the relation between permits endowment and
energy consumption is the same for the two sectors), then the energy intensive sector is
at least after some time more a®ected by the environmental policy than the other sector.
It also appears that the fact that a ¯rm internalize or not the relation between its permits
endowment and its past emissions does not a®ect this last result.
The last stage of the analysis is to evaluate the impact of the environmental policy
at the regional level. This is done both at the level of the regional added value and at
the level of the total regional revenue (i.e. taking account of the regional endowments
of permits). The impact depends crucially on the specialization of the region along the
baseline. The two regions converge to the same specialization (measured by the ratio of
the capital stocks of their respective sectors), but not necessarily in a monotonous way.
Conditions are established under which the spread of specialization, that depends on the
initial capital endowments and on the technological spillovers, might be reversed. If the
energy intensive sector is more a®ected than the other sector, then the region specialized in
the energy intensive sector su®ers more from the environmental policy. One also observes
that translated in the framework of the Belgian debate, our result suggests that there will
be no inversion of specialization (at least after some time), so that Wallonia is likely to
be more a®ected than Flanders by environmental policies as modeled in this paper, not
only in the short run (as in Germain et al., 2006) but also in the long run.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 characterizes (i) the dynamic 2
sectors - 2 regions - 2 inputs (capital and energy) Heckscher-Ohlin model of a small open
economy, (ii) the way interregional technological spillovers at the sector level are modeled
and (iii) the specialization of the regions. Section 3 is devoted to the impacts of an
environmental policy in the framework of an international permits market. One starts by
characterizing the main assumptions underlying the baseline (no policy) scenario. Then
the impacts of the environmental policy are evaluated as stated above, starting at the
level of the sectors' growth rate and ¯nishing at the level of the regions' total revenue.
42 The model
We model a 2 regions - 2 sectors - 2 inputs small open multiregional economy where :
- the 2 regions are indexed by i (i = v;w),
- the 2 sectors (or 2 goods) are indexed by j (j = a;b),
- the 2 inputs are capital (k) and fossil energy (e).
Capital is understood in a broad sense, i.e. as a bundle of inputs like physical and
human capital, infrastructures, non-fossil energy,... Given that we consider a small open
economy, agents are price-takers and prices are determined by the Rest of the World
and thus exogenous. Sector a produces capital goods, sector b produces consumption
goods. Energy is imported. Technology depends only on the sector and is the same
for the two regions. National and foreign products of a certain type are supposed to
be perfect substitutes. Emissions are linked to energy consumption, and for the sake of
simplicity, e denotes simultaneously energy and emissions. We assume that there exists
an international tradable permits market where polluting ¯rms can buy of sell permits at
a given exogenous price.
2.1 Behavior of the ¯rms
The technology of sector j (j = a;b) of region i (i = v;w) at date t (t ¸ 1) is described






where y;k and e are production, capital and energy respectively and A is a coe±cient
that measures technological progress. The technological parameters ®j and ¯j verify
0 < ®j;¯j < ®j + ¯j < 1:
The representative ¯rm of sector j of region i is assumed to choose the °ow of its energy






[1 + r]t (2)
under the constraints that
kijt = kij;t¡1[1 ¡ ±j] + iijt; t ¸ 1 (3)
eijt = e eijt + ¸jteij;t¡1 + ¹jtyij;t¡1; t ¸ 1 (4)
where by de¯nition
¼ijt = pjtyijt ¡ qteijt ¡ patiijt + ¿t [eijt ¡ eijt] (5)
and where eij0; kij0 and yij0 are given. r is the (exogenous) positive discount rate. (3)
is the familiar capital accumulation equation, where ± measures the depreciation rate of
capital and (5) de¯nes ¼ijt as the current pro¯t of sector j of region i at date t; where
pj;q and ¿ are the prices of good j (j = a;b), energy and tradable permits respectively.
. Following BÄ oringer and Lange (2005), (4) de¯nes the permits endowment received by
sector j of region i at date t (eijt) as a linear function of its production and emissions
of the previous period, where e eijt;¸jt and ¹jt are given exogenous (eventually variable)
positive parameters.
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[1 + r]t [b pjtyijt ¡ e qteijt ¡ e pjtkijt + ¿te eijt] (6)
where we de¯ne












as the user cost of capital of sector j at date t and




as the user cost of energy of sector j at date t:














ijt ¡ e qjt = 0



















































2.2 Endogenous growth and technical spillovers
One assumes that
Aijt = ½t [µjtkij;t¡1 + [1 ¡ µjt]Kj;t¡1]
°j (15)
where by de¯nition, Kjt = kwjt +kvjt is the capital of sector j at the country level. °j
is such that ®j+¯j+ °j = 1; i.e. global returns to scale are constant. ½t and µjt (t ¸ 1) are
exogenous positive parameters. With respect to the spillover parameters µjt; we assume
that 0 · µjt < 1 (8t ¸ 1) and limt!+1 = µj < 1. (15) shows that the productivity factor
of sector j of region i at time t depends not only of the capital of this sector inherited
from the previous period, but also of the capital of the same sector of the other region.
There is thus a interregional technological spillover at the sector level. The spillover is
intra-sectoral as mentioned repeatedly below. Notice that the larger µjt, the lower the
impact of the learning-by-investing accumulated in region w on technological progress in
region v for sector j. We shall use this observation in some interpretations later on.
Finally, we assume that the price of sector a is the numeraire, i.e. pat = 1 (8t ¸ 1),
which implies that the cost of capital is constant for both sectors (e pjt = e pj =
±j+r
1+r ; j =
a;b):

















= ³jt½t [µjtkij;t¡1 + [1 ¡ µjt]Kj;t¡1]
= ³jt½t
h
kij;t¡1 + [1 ¡ µjt]ke ij;t¡1
i
(16)














For each sector j, we consider the system:
kwjt = ³jt½[kwj;t¡1 + [1 ¡ µjt]kvj;t¡1] (18)
kvjt = ³jt½t [kvj;t¡1 + [1 ¡ µjt]kwj;t¡1] (19)
t 2 T ; kwj0 and kvj0 given.

































Proof. See appendix. ¤
It follows immediately that for a given sector j; if the two regions have the same initial
endowment of capital in that sector (i.e. kwj0 = kvj0), then their respective endowment
of capital remain equal in all periods (kvjt = kwjt = 1
2 [kwj0 + kvj0]
Qt
m=1 ³jm½m [2 ¡ µjm]):
Furthermore :
Corollary 1 Whatever the initial conditions and the exogenous patterns, the regional











³jm½m [2 ¡ µjm]; j = a;b
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kij0 + ke ij0 +
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where e i is the other region. Given that by assumption, the sequence µjt is such that
0 · µjt < 1 and limt!+1 = µj < 1; we have :
µjm





2¡µjm is strictly decreasing, and since it is bounded, it is converging.
Notice that !jt is asymptotically geometric with coe±cient
µj
2¡µj < 1; which implies that
limt!+1 !jt = 0: ¤
This strong result follows from the fact that besides di®erent initial sectoral dotation
of capital, the two regions are identical : they face the same international prices and
share the same technologies. In the presence of intra-sectoral spillovers, the divergence
force coming from endogenous growth (namely, constant returns) is neutralized. Indeed,
notice that if the parameters µjt = 1 for every t, then equations (18) and (19) would
imply that the capital stocks of the two regions will diverge over time if the initial stocks
are di®erent. If this sequence of parameters is permanently strictly below 1, then such
a divergence vanishes because intra-sectoral spillovers will neutralize the divergence force
arising from the underlying AK structure.




= ³jt½t [2 ¡ µjt]Xijt; i = v;w; j = a;b; t ¸ 1 (23)
where by de¯nition :
Xijt =
kij0 + ke ij0 +
h
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; which as expected does not depend on i:
82.3 Specialization of the regions





We also de¯ne the spread of specialization index at time t by the ratio of the specialization









The purpose of the present subsection is to study what determines the evolution of the
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One observes the remarkable fact that the spread of specialization index depends only
on the initial stocks of capital and on the spillovers parameters that are exogenous. As
a consequence this index will not be a®ected by the environmental policies that are con-
sidered below. This does not mean that the specialization index of a region (de¯ned by
(25)) does not change under an environmental policy w.r.t. the baseline. It means that
the specialization indexes of the two regions are a®ected identically such that their spread
remains unchanged.
















¾t = 1 (28)
This result follows immediately from Corollary 1. (27) shows that in the long run the re-
gional specialization index re°ects the initial specialization index at the national level and
the exogenous patterns of prices (through the parameters ³jm (see (17)), which interact
multiplicatively in our model.
Assume that ¾0 > 1 (i.e. Region w is more specialized in the production of the capital
good). The preceding result does not imply that ¾t decreases monotonously from ¾0 > 1
to ¾1 = 1. We have indeed the following proposition :
Proposition 2 The spread of specialization index might be reversed in period t w.r.t.
period 0 (i.e. ¾0 > 1 and ¾t < 1); depending on the ratio of the spillover parameters
µbt=µat (t ¸ 1) and on the initial capital endowments.
9Proof. Given (26), it is easy to verify that ¾t < 1 implies that :










Two cases emerge :
(a) kwb0 ¡ kvb0 > 0 : then it follows that kwa0 ¡ kva0 > 0 because ¾0 > 1 by assumption.
Then ¾t < 1 i®
[kwb0 + kvb0][kwa0 ¡ kva0]









which holds if the sequence fµbt; t ¸ 1g is in "average" high enough w.r.t. the sequence
fµat; t ¸ 1g 2;
(b) kwb0 ¡ kvb0 < 0 : it follows that ¾t < 1 i®
[kwb0 + kvb0][kwa0 ¡ kva0]









which holds if kwa0 ¡kva0 < 0 and if the sequence fµbt; t ¸ 1g is in "average" low enough
w.r.t. the sequence fµat; t ¸ 1g 3. ¤
3 Impact of an environmental policy
3.1 Preliminaries
We assume that the baseline tends in the long run to a balanced growth path characterized




























and where Xijt is de¯ned by (24). This is equivalent to assume that at the world level,
the evolution of prices of goods re°ects sectoral technical progress, the costs of inputs and
























j (j = a;b)
are constants.
As we aim to compare the impacts of an environmental policy (EP) between sectors
and between regions, we state the two following important assumptions :
2This implies that in the long term (i.e. when the sequences are close to their limit values µj (j = a;b))
the ratio µb=µa is high enough.
3In case (b), if kwa0 ¡ kva0 > 0; then the regions have opposite specializations (i.e. kwa0 > kva0 and
kwb0 < kvb0). Then a remarkable fact is that the previous inequality cannot be satis¯ed whatever the
spillover parameters (inversion of specialization is impossible).
10- Sector a is more energy intensive than sector b :
¯a > ¯b (33)







In this respect, assumption (34) means that Region w is initially more specialized than
Region v in the production of good a (Âw0 > Âv0 , ¾0 > 1):
We look at the impact of an environmental policy (EP) characterized by a sequence
of permits prices f¿t; t ¸ 1g and by permits endowments de¯ned by (4). Now, as will
soon become clear below, it is impossible to obtain clear-cut results when comparing the
impacts of the EP between sectors or between regions if this policy is characterized by
a general burden sharing rule like (4). In order to derive precise results, we will mainly
focus on dynamic emission-based grand-fathering rules, where a ¯rm's current permits
endowment depends on its previous period emissions4. We qualify this dependance as the
"endowment" e®ect and consider two cases whether this e®ect is internalized or not by
¯rms when they maximise their pro¯ts :
- No internalisation5 : one applies (4) with ¸jt = ¹jt = 0 (j = a;b; 8t ¸ 1) and :
eijt = e eijt = ´eij;t¡1;
where 0 < ´ < 1 and eij;t¡1 are the emissions characterising the EP until t ¡ 1: e eijt is
considered as exogenous by the ¯rms when they solve problem (2), then given (7) and
(9), b pjt = pjt and e qjt = qt + ¿t:
- Internalisation : one applies (4) with e eijt = ¹j = 0 and :
eijt = ¸jeij;t¡1
where 0 < ¸j < 1 and eij;t¡1 are the emissions characterising the EP until t ¡ 1: eijt is
considered as endogenous by the ¯rms when they solve problem (2), then given (7) and
(9), b pjt = pjt and e qjt = qt + ¿t ¡ ¿t+1
¸j
1+r.
We will also assume that ¸j is su±ciently small so that the e®ect of today's energy
consumption on tomorrow's permits endowment is never su±cient to counteract the direct
increase of the total cost of energy through the permits price (i.e. ¿t ¡ ¿t+1
¸j
1+r > 0; j =
a;b; 8t ¸ 1). The baseline is characterized by a sequence of permits prices equal to 0.
In a next subsection, we will also brie°y consider a "production-based grand-fathering"
sharing rule in order to highlight how results can depend crucially on the chosen endow-
ment rule.
3.2 Impact on the sectoral growth rates



















4The dependance could go further in the past (see BÄ ohringer and Lange (2005)).
5This could be justi¯ed if the rule applies at an aggregate level and if the ¯rm is small and receives a
¯xed share of the total permits endowment.
11A ¯rst observation is that the impact of the EP on the sectoral growth rates is the same








; j = a;b (36)
This is because the sectors j of both regions face the same exogenous prices and share
the same technologies.
Given assumptions (33) and (34) and the assumptions about the EP in the previous




















A second observation is that the EP a®ects negatively the sectoral growth rates, i.e.
gijt < gB
ijt; because the user cost of energy increases (given that we have assumed that
¿t ¡ ¿t+1
¸j
1+r > 0; 8j = a;b; 8t ¸ 1):
We now compare the impacts of the EP on the capital accumulation of the two sectors
of a given region w.r.t. the baseline. More precisely, we look in what extent the following








; i = v;w (38)
By assumption (33) (¯a > ¯b), and thanks to the fact that it is assumed that the user
cost of energy increases with the EP, it follows from (37) that a su±cient condition for
the inequality (38) to be veri¯ed is that ¸a · ¸b. The growth rate of the energy intensive
capital sector a is more a®ected by the EP than the accumulation capital of the other
sector if the endowment e®ect relative to sector a is not higher than the one relative to
sector b.
3.3 Impact on the sectoral capital stock
We compare the impacts of the EP on the capital accumulation of the two sectors of a
given region w.r.t. the baseline. More precisely, we look in what extent the following








; i = v;w (39)








































where the second equality follows from (37). By the previous subsection, we know that
a su±cient condition for the inequality gijm < gB
ijm (8j = a;b; 8t ¸ 1) to be veri¯ed is
that ¸a · ¸b. Then it follows immediately that the accumulation of capital of the energy
12intensive capital sector a is more a®ected by the EP than the accumulation capital of the
other sector if the endowment e®ect relative to sector a is not higher than the one relative
to sector b.
Furthermore, given (36), it follows that the accumulation of capital of a given sector








; j = a;b (41)
3.4 The dynamic production-based grand-fathering rule
To highlight how results depends crucially on the chosen endowment rule, let us consider
brie°y the dynamic production-based grand-fathering rule, where a ¯rm's current permits
endowment depends on its previous period production6. We assume that this dependance
is identical across sectors and regions and that it is internalized by ¯rms when they
maximise their pro¯ts. Formally, one applies (4) with e eijt = ¸jt = 0 and :
eijt = ¹yij;t¡1
where 0 < ¹ < 1 and yij;t¡1 is the production characterising the EP until t ¡ 1: eijt is
considered as endogenous by the ¯rms when they solve problem (2). Then given (7) and
(9), b pjt = pjt + ¿t+1
¹

















































(j = a;b)). Because of assumption (33), the second term between brackets of the RHS is
lower for sector a: But if pbt is increasing (as is observed empirically), then the ¯rst term
between brackets of the RHS is lower for sector b; and the overall e®ect is undecidable
without more information on the parameters. Con¯gurations of parameters are possible
where one obtains the opposite e®ect as the one obtained with the emission-based grand-
fathering rules analyzed above, i.e. with equality (39) is reversed (for example if the
consumption good price increases su±ciently quickly because of a low exogenous technical
progress ½t):
3.5 Impact on the sectoral added value
In the remaining of the paper we return exclusively to the emission-based grand-fathering
rules because they lead to more clear-cut conclusions. To simplify the analysis, we make
the additional assumption that the endowment e®ect is identical across sectors and regions
(i.e. ¸j = ¸ (j = a;b)). The EP is thus characterized by b pjt = pjt and e qjt = e qt =
qm + ¿m ¡ ¿m+1
¸
1+r:
We now compare the impacts of the EP on the added value of the two sectors of a
given region w.r.t. the baseline. In our setting, the intermediate consumption is limited
6The dependance could go further in the past (see BÄ ohringer and Lange (2005)).
13to the imported energy consumption. Thus :
vaijt = pjtyijt ¡ qteijt












Along the baseline, b pjt = pjt and e qjt = qt; so that
va
B





The impact of the EP on the added value of sector j of region i at time t is measured






















In a similar manner as what was done for the capital stock, we look in what extent








; i = v;w (45)
As shown by (44), the global impact on vaijt is the product of two fractions. The
second one measures the impact on the regional sectoral capital stock analyzed in the
previous subsection. We know that this impact is stronger for sector a. The ¯rst fraction
measures an e®ect due to the increase of the total cost of energy. Unfortunately, this
energy cost e®ect a®ects the added value the other way round (1¡¯j
qt
e qt > 1¡¯j). Indeed,
because of the increase of total cost of energy, its share arises in the value of production.
And this e®ect is stronger the higher ¯j: Thus the inequality (45) does not follow trivially.













































One has the following proposition:












Proof. See appendix. ¤













tends to 0. The above proposition is likely to be veri¯ed
14in the case of a more and more constraining EP. Then the price of permits ¿ should indeed
increase. This would induce ¯rms to reduce their demand of fossil energy, thereby pushing
down the price of fossil energy q.
On the contrary, the above proposition is likely to be invalidated if the EP remains

















qm = 0; which would only
happen if the price of fossil energy increases at a higher rate than the price of permits.
3.6 Impact on the sectoral revenues with transfers
The sectoral revenue with transfers is de¯ned as the sum of the added value of the sector
and of the net endowment of permits:
rijt = vaijt + ¿t [eijt ¡ eijt]; i = v;w; j = a;b; t ¸ 1 (47)
where eijt is de¯ned by (4).
Let us ¯rst consider the non anticipated emission-based grand-fathering sharing rule.
Given (47) and the fact that along the baseline, rB
ijt = vaB









¿t [´eij;t¡1 ¡ eijt]
vaB
ijt
We know the ¯rst term of the RHS by (44). We now consider the second term: given




e qtkijt: Then, thanks to (43):










































































In this last equality appears sector j's growth rate characterising the EP scenario.













































; i = v;w (49)
We have the following result:
15Proposition 4 The inequality (49) necessarily holds after some time.








; i = v;w (see subsection 3.3). A su±cient




































If Xiat ¼ Xibt (which is necessarily the case after some time because these two variables
tend to the same limit equal to 1), then the previous inequality holds. Indeed, the two
members can then be written as the values at ¯a and ¯b of the function ht(x) =
1¡xAt(x)
1¡x ;











1¡x < 0; because 0 < x < 1;
At > 1 and A0
t > 0 (given that e qt > qt): Then the inequality follows from assumption (33).
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Then the above proposition follows again by a similar reasoning. It appears that the
fact that ¯rms anticipate the endowment e®ect or not (as explained in subsection 3.1)
does not modify the previous proposition.
It is interesting to observe that the above proposition will be veri¯ed in the context of
a loose EP with an increasing scarcity of fossil energy resources. Then qt increases quicker










3.7 Impact on the regional product
The regional product is de¯ned by the sum of the added value of the two sectors of the
























where the share of sector a in region i's regional product at time t at the baseline
(vaB
iat=V AB




























































vat; which is equivalent to ¾t ¸ 1 7. There
should not be any inversion of specialization at date t w.r.t. date 0: Now Proposition
2 states the conditions for a specialization inversion. Thus it is su±cient to inverse
conditions (29) and (30) in order to guaranty that inequality (52) is veri¯ed:
(a) kwb0 ¡ kvb0 > 0 : it follows that ¾t > 1 i®:
[kwb0 + kvb0][kwa0 ¡ kva0]








From assumption (34) it follows that kwa0 > kva0: The sequence fµat; t ¸ 1g must
be in "average" high enough w.r.t. the sequence fµbt; t ¸ 1g: This implies that in the
long term, i.e. when the sequences are close to their limit values µj (j = a;b); the above
inequality implies that the ratio µb=µa is low enough.
(b) kwb0 ¡ kvb0 < 0 : it follows that ¾t > 1 i®:
[kwb0 + kvb0][kwa0 ¡ kva0]








If kwa0 ¡ kva0 < 0; then the sequence fµat; t ¸ 1g must be in "average" low enough
w.r.t. the sequence fµbt; t ¸ 1g: This implies that in the long term, i.e. when the se-
quences are close to their limit values µj (j = a;b); the above inequality implies that the
ratio µb=µa is high enough. If kwa0 ¡ kva0 > 0; the regions have opposite specializations
(i.e. kwa0 > kva0 and kwb0 < kvb0), then a remarkable fact is that the above inequality is
necessarily satis¯ed whatever the spillover parameters.
In summary, the EP a®ects more the regional product of Region w at date t if this
region is more specialized in the energy intensive sector 1 at date t. Regarding the Belgian
situation, one has kwb0 < kvb0 (where w is Wallonia and v is Flanders), so that case (b)
above applies. Because it is generally expected that the technological spillovers are higher
in the capital good sector (1¡µat ¸ 1¡µbt =) µat · µbt; t ¸ 1); one has an indication that
there will be no inversion of specialization (at least after some time), so that Wallonia is
likely to be more a®ected than Flanders by an EP such as studied in this paper.
3.8 Impact on the regional revenues with transfers
The total revenue (i.e. after transfers) of region i (i = v;w) at time t writes:
Rit = riat + ribt; i = v;w























7Remember that the spread of specialization index is not modi¯ed by the environmental policy.
17where we have made use of the fact that along the baseline, rB
ijt = vaB
ijt (j = a;b) )
RB
it = V AB


































vat , ¾t ¸ 1; which is the same condition that
has been studied in the previous subsection.
4 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper has been designed to study the burden sharing of
pollution sharing in the context of a Kyoto-like protocol in a multi-regional multi-sectoral
economy. In order to get the dynamic picture, we have considered time-dependent intra-
sectoral spillovers across regions and learning-by-investing in each sector. In such a con-
text, we have shown progressively how the typical wisdom gathered for the static case
can be altered. In particular, we have disentangled the main price-based and quantity-
based mechanisms which determine the impact of environmental policy at di®erent levels
(sectoral value-added and regional notably).
Within this framework, we have been able to extract some qualitative predictions for
a country like Belgium. Nonetheless, a much more serious quantitative assessment is
needed, and this would require a rigorous calibration of the model, including the exogenous
price processes involved. A major di±culty comes from the fact that some processes like
the price of pollution permits are not very well known given the short historical record.
Alternatively, some reasonable scenarios could be considered. We are currently working
in this line of research.
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196 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The system (18-19) can be rewritten in a planar stacked form :




1 1 ¡ µjt
















2 ¡ µjm 0
0 µjm
¸































Then noticing that P¡1 = P=2; one obtains (20) and (21).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3




t ; where 0 ·





























: Therefore, the sign of h0
t(x) is the sign
of the polynomial of degree 2 : Pt(x) = [1 ¡ x][1 ¡ Atx]
ln(Bt)




1¡' [1 + At]x +
h


























0: Thus Pt(x) admits two real roots. These roots are :
x1t =















20with x2t is higher than 1, and is thus of no interest because we limit the analysis of ht(x)
for 0 · x < 1: x1t is at its maximum value (equal to 1) when 1 = 4At
1¡At
1¡'
lnBt: Thus x1t · 1:
Pt(x) is concave and is thus negative when x · x1t and positive when x1t · x; which
implies that ht(x) is decreasing when x · x1t and increasing when x1t · x: (46) can only
be veri¯ed if ht(x) is decreasing at least on some part of the interval [0;1[; which supposes
that x1t > 0: A su±cient condition for (46) to be satis¯ed is then that ¯b < ¯a < x1t;
which is more likely to be veri¯ed the more x1t is close to 1, that is when Bt is small
enough. In practice, it is not necessary that x1t should be close to 1, because ¯j (j = a;b)
can be interpreted as the share of fossil energy in production, and should thus be closer
to 0 than to 1.
21